Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...) that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...) extends to the environment. Then I will expand the notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially extended. (shrink)

In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...) predicates are after all projectible. In this paper, I argue that Goodman's claim must be construed within his project for constructional definitions, which is methodologically oriented by reflective equilibrium. The description of inductive practice is committed to the articulation of the extension of the class selected by the predicate ‘valid induction’. The mutual adjustment between theoretical considerations and inductive practice involved in the proposal of a definition of ‘valid induction’ must preserve that practice as much as possible, there is no way to get rid of entrenchment. Empirical discoveries about the psychological mechanism that underlies projections may help that adjustment but they cannot substitute the role played by the entrenchment of predicates. (shrink)

The argument from illusion/hallucination have been proposed many times as supporting the strong conclusion that we are always perceiving directly sense-data. In Sense & Sensibilia, Austin argues that this argument is based on a “mass of seductive (mainly verbal) fallacies”. In this paper, I argue that Austin's argumentative moves to deconstruct the argument from illusion is better understood if they are seen as due to his implicit commitment to some disjunctivist conception of perception. His considerations should be taken as a (...) depth discussion about how to conceive perception. If we conceive the perceptual capacity disjunctively, even the weaker conclusion that we sometimes perceive sense-data does not hold. In response to Austin, Ayer claimed that the strong conclusion of the argument from illusion could be sustained by the method of the possibility of error. I argue that this method alone does not sustain that conclusion and the controversy turns back to the conflict between different conceptions of perception. The argument from illusion is philosophically interesting by putting in evidence the problem of how the perceptual capacity should be articulated and conceived. Although matters of fact are relevant to this question, they alone do not decide it. (shrink)

Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...) says about those practices is correct in relation to the appropriateness of making knowledge claims, but that the skeptic is interested in the truth of those claims. In this paper, we argue that Stroud’s defense of the alleged requirement smuggles in a commitment to a kind of internalism, which asserts that the perceptual justification available to us can be characterized independently of the circumstances in which we find ourselves. In our reading of Austin, especially of Sense & Sensibilia, he rejects that kind of internalism by an implicit commitment to what is called today a “disjunctive” view of perception. Austin says that objectivity is an aspect of knowledge, and his disjunctivism is part of an explanation of why the alleged requirement is not necessary for a knowledge claim. Since both Stroud and Austin are committed to the objectivity of knowledge, Stroud may ask which view of perceptual knowledge is correct, whether the internalist or the disjunctive. We argue that by paying closer attention to what Austin says about our practices of knowledge attribution, one can see more clearly that it is grounded not only on a conception of objectivity, but also on a conception of ourselves as information agents, a conception that is as deeply rooted as that of the objectivity of knowledge. This gives us moral and practical reasons to favor the disjunctive view of perception. (shrink)

The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...) the case, shared know-how can belong to the participants of a social activity or to the system the participants bring forth together. In relation to the second issue, I sustain, following the authors, a non-reductive account of shared know-how. I also suggest that responsiveness to others, which is a fundamental element of shared know-how, can be extended by perceptual learning. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that some mental states and cognitive processes extend onto the environment. Items external to the organism or exploratory actions may constitute in part mental states and cognitive processes. In Clark and Chalmers’ original paper, ‘The Extended Mind’, this thesis receives support from the parity principle and from the active externalism. In their paper, more emphasis is given to the parity principle, which is presented as neutral regarding the nature of cognition. It would be advantageous to (...) maintain that extended mental states and processes do not require a reform of our pre-theoretical view of cognition. In the present paper, I submit that we should give more emphasis on the active externalism, which, I argue, is not neutral regarding the nature of cognition. Cognition is viewed as successful adaptation to a specific task. Although this move may seem at first disadvantageous, it is necessary for the correct understanding and justification of Otto case as an example of extended mental state. Additionally, the parity principle cannot handle Weiskopf’s criticism that information registered in Otto’s notebook is not responsive to reasons. In order to address this criticism, we need to appeal to active externalism and its corresponding view of cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...) epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...) knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. (shrink)

In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how perceptual experience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that perceptual experience justifies non-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discuss this question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. (...) But I will defend that there is no such need. The content can be non-conceptual and even so the experience can justify beliefs non-inferentially. I will try to explain how this is possible and at the end I will assess my approach in the face of Sellars' claim that empiricism assumes a triad of inconsistents thesis. I will recast these thesis in accordance with the approach defended and I will conclude that this present version of empiricism is free from Sellars's criticism. (shrink)

In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that (...) takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.

In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...) becoming sensitized to its affordances. I call this position ecological disjunctivism. A corollary of this position is that a case of perception and its corresponding case of hallucination—which is similar to the former only in some respects—are different in nature. I show then how the distinguishability problem is addressed by ecological disjunctivism. (shrink)

Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.

The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...) pretends that its application is suitable for the preference of a hypothesis. I argue that the nature of this vindication is such that it may be applied also to induction. Thus, to be a popperian is a good reason also to be an inductivist. (shrink)

The foundationalist needs to deal with two fundamental problems: (i) to explain how a justificator grants justification without itself need justification and (ii) to determine the justificator’s epistemic status. Burdzinski (Burdzinski 2007), following Sellars and Bonjour, argues that the perceptive experience could not be a response to the first problem, because if its content was not propositional it would not grant justification and if its content was propositional it would grant justification and would require justification. My proposal is that perceptual (...) experience justifies in virtue of its representational nature. The act of taking the content of a perception by its face value is justified until there is a reason to the contrary, ie, this act is prima facie justified. This forces us to answer the second problem by saying that the basic justificator is not infallible. This falibilist response dislike the skeptic, but it is the best foundationalist answer to epistemic regress. (shrink)

A partir de imagens de crianças encontradas no cinema dos primeiros tempos, propomos uma reflexão sobre as relações entre a infância e cinema. Segundo Walter Benjamin (2009), tanto a infância quanto o cinema são invenções da modernidade: o conceito de infância como um período importante de formação do sujeito nasce de forma inseparável das tecnologias de produção e reprodução da imagem que nos dão a ver as crianças de uma forma inédita, primeiro na fotografia e depois no cinema. A partir (...) disso, nos perguntamos se seria possível pensar na “invenção” do cinema como também um gesto de infância? Nos propomos a pensar uma ideia de infância do cinema para além de um reducionismo teleológico. Para tanto, partimos de uma visão psicanalítica sobre o processo de entrada na linguagem, que coincide com o movimento de individuação do sujeito, na infância. A partir desta perspectiva, estabelecemos uma analogia entre a infância e o desenvolvimento do cinema como momentos igualmente marcados pela entrada na linguagem: de um estado atravessado fortemente pela visualidade, pela experimentação, pela descoberta e pela brincadeira, em direção a uma entrada no sistema simbólico estruturado da linguagem através de constantes negociações com as convenções e os limites do mundo adulto. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo identificar e discutir alguns encontros e desencontros existentes entre a epistemologia qualitativa, a fenomenologia e a pesquisa-ação, no que diz respeito à natureza, aos objetivos e procedimentos adotados. Nesse sentido, realizamos uma revisão teórica para identificar as características comuns e divergentes entre as categorias de pesquisa investigadas. Para tanto, buscamos as contribuições teóricas de González Rey acerca da teoria da subjetividade e de sua epistemologia qualitativa, de Moreira e seus estudos sobre a fenomenologia e, (...) por fim, de Thiollent, que apresenta as principais características da pesquisa-ação. (shrink)

Neste texto, debatemos a leitura no ensino superior. O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar alguns debates sobre a leitura no ensino superior. Foi realizadauma pesquisa bibliográfica com o objetivo de buscar textos em periódicos científicos que tratassem do tema leitura no ensino superior. Os debates identificados convergem para a relevância social da leitura e para o entendimento da leitura como uma habilidade a ser desenvolvida. Destacamos as preocupações com o significado social e com a aprendizagem da leitura na maioria dos (...) textos selecionados. Concluímos que os processos de leitura não se distinguem no âmbito universitário, onde a leitura do conhecimento científico, a leitura de textos da literatura e a leitura de informações do cotidiano encontram-se presentes e são desenvolvidas sem atenção para as suas diferentes formas e seus diferentes objetivos. (shrink)

ObjectiveThis study aims to analyze sociohistorically how the normative patterns of hegemonic masculinity produced impacts on men’s health/mental health in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsA qualitative study from a socio-historical perspective was conducted with 50 men based on an online survey. A semistructured form was applied. The data were analyzed by the Collective Subject Discourse method, interpreted in the light of the context of epidemic disease and hegemonic masculinity.ResultsThe experience of the pandemic exposed the normative patterns of masculinities from (...) the consummation of acts representative of the pandemic context, which incited men to deny the existence of COVID-19 disease and to delay the understanding and adoption of measures to protect and control COVID-19. As a repercussion, men presented conflicts in the regulation of emotions; presented emotional suppression; were more reactive; felt threatened regarding the loss of the role of family provider, virility; and revealed a sense of invulnerability, added to the weakening of self-care.ConclusionThe discourse revealed that the men’s behaviors are consistent with the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, but express signs of recognition that this behavior causes harm to themselves and their health. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seem not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...) while the second one seems to require its falsity. In the second part, based on Alva Noë's actionist theory of perception, I argue in favor of a less intellectualist interpretation of the first claim, uncommitted to content conceptualism, and then I show how it can be reconciled with the second claim. Finally, I explain how perception holds rational relationships with our empirical thought through the exercise of observational concepts. These concepts link what I propose to call 'space of actions' to the logical space of reasons. (shrink)

A ideia de que a ciência — ou ao menos as atividades científicas que são consideradas as mais essenciais para a ciência — deve ser livre de valores é bastante difundida. Neste capítulo, vou discutir essa tese, normalmente entendida como um ideal de ciência. Na primeira seção, introduzo alguns conceitos e distinções que são importantes para entender essa tese, como a diferença entre valores cognitivos e não-cognitivos. Na segunda seção, discuto o papel dos valores na seleção de problemas e na (...) metodologia científica. Na terceira seção, apresento dois argumentos canônicos contra o ideal da ciência como livre de valores: o argumento da lacuna explicativa, de Helen Longino (1990), e o argumento do risco indutivo, de Heather Douglas (2009). Na quarta seção, discuto algumas respostas a esses argumentos. Por fim, na última seção, a partir da abordagem ecológica, exploro e sustendo a ideia de que a reconcepção da ciência como uma atividade social situada e adaptativa supera a dicotomia entre fato e valor que subjaz a discussão. Essa nova concepção de ciência nos permite acomodar melhor os resultados dos argumentos apresentados na terceira seção. (shrink)

Neste texto, apresento e examino as principais ideias que animam a abordagem ecológica da percepção. Primeiro, na Seção 2, apresento a visão instantânea da percepção, contra a qual Gibson articula e propõe a abordagem ecológica. Em seguida, na Seção 3, apresento e discuto a noção de informação ecológica. Nas seções 4 e 5 articulo a teoria das affordances e discuto a aprendizagem perceptiva. Por fim, na Seção 6, exponho e discuto a possibilidade de estender a teoria das affordances para explicar (...) a cognição social. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende discutir a concepção de aparência desenvolvida por Hannah Arendt na obra A Vida do Espírito (1977), tendo em vista a centralidade da questão como elemento inicial da reflexão sobre as atividades do espírito. Inicialmente, o texto discorre sobre parte dos atravessamentos teóricos presentes na interpretação arendtiana da aparência, concentrando-se no conteúdo de referência em Martin Heidegger. Como resultado, ocorre um afastamento realizado pela autora em relação à metafísica tradicional, e tal postura crítica será compreendida a partir do (...) diálogo com Heidegger e Kant. Assim, na sua transversalidade com a faculdade do pensar e com o ser em geral, entende-se que a crítica à metafísica é consequência direta da concepção de aparência proposta pela autora. Por fim, uma breve elucidação metodológica do conteúdo de A Vida do Espírito será apresentada, com o intuito de justificar seu caráter interpretativo baseado no método fenomenológico-hermenêutico aos moldes heideggerianos, em detrimento de uma descrição fenomenológica de inspiração husserliana. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the discussion between Ayer and Austin about whether sentences or utterances can be incorrigible and I argue in favor of Austin position. I defend Austin against objections from Ayer presented after the publication of Sense & Sensibilia. Unlike what was sustained by Ayer, experiential sentences and material object sentences are not epistemically asymmetrical. A material object sentence can be incorrigible if uttered in appropriated circumstances, and an experiential sentence can be corrigible if uttered in unappropriated (...) circumstances. Relying on Austin position, I argue that self-knowledge does not have any epistemic privilege in relation to knowledge of the external world. These kinds of knowledge equally depend on objective circumstances of the utterance situation. (shrink)

Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença (...) se relaciona com a ética diz respeito à fundamentação das normas para crer. A ideia é que a adoção dessas normas se fundamenta com base em razões morais e sociais. Por fim, o modo mais substancial consiste em sustentar que o ato de crer, ao menos em alguns casos, é em parte um fenômeno essencialmente moral e que, portanto, razões morais incidem diretamente sobre a legitimidade da crença. Por razões morais, alguém poderia ser recriminado por sustentar uma crença ainda que tivesse evidência favorável para ela. Neste verbete, tangenciando o clássico debate entre Clifford e William James e reações mais contemporâneas ao debate, apresentaremos e discutiremos cada um desses aspectos da ética da crença. (shrink)

Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...) e, assim, adquirir conhecimento perceptivo acerca do mundo. A importância desse conhecimento acerca do que está ao nosso alcance perceptivo é inestimável para a nossa sobrevivência e a condução de nossos projetos cotidianos. Contudo, podemos querer saber (1) se de fato temos acesso ao mundo físico circundante por meio das nossas experiências perceptivas, e (2) se e como essas experiências justificam as nossas crenças acerca do que percebemos. Esses problemas são centrais para a epistemologia da percepção, embora não sejam os únicos. Nessa entrada, abordaremos esses dois problemas. (shrink)

A tese da mente estendida alega que ao menos alguns processos cognitivos se estendem para além do cérebro do organismo no sentido de que eles são constituídos por ações realizadas por esse organismo no ambiente ao seu redor. Um movimento mais radical seria alegar que ações sociais realizadas pelo organismo poderiam pelo menos constituir alguns dos seus processos cognitivos. Isso pode ser chamando de tese da mente socialmente estendida. Baseando-me na noção de affordance tal como ela foi desenvolvida na tradição (...) da psicologia ecológica, eu defendo que a percepção se estende ao meio ambiente. Então, apoiado no fenômeno da atenção conjunta, eu estendo a noção de affordance para encorporar affordances sociais. Assim, a percepção pode, em algumas situações, ser também estendida socialmente. (shrink)

O presente artigo deseja evidenciar que, ainda que a libido e a sexualidade tenham sido incluídas no conceito de Eros a partir de Além do princípio do prazer, a sexualidade no interior no pensamento freudiana não perdeu seu caráter disruptivo e não deixou de ser considerada como causa de profundas perturbações para a vida psíquica humana. Para tal, serão reconstruídos os argumentos sobre a natureza conservadora das pulsões e se procurará propor a ideia de que os conceitos de expansão, (...) repetição e conservação, intimamente associados à dinâmica pulsional, não podem ser vistos como elementos que teriam retirado à sexualidade sua natureza disruptiva e conflitiva no interior da obra freudiana. (shrink)

Despite the ubiquity of healthcare simulation and the humanities in medical education, the two domains of learning remain unintegrated. The stories suffused within healthcare simulation have thus remained unshaped by the developments of narrative medicine and the health humanities. Healthcare simulation, in turn, has yet to utilize concepts like co-construction and narrative competence to enrich learners’ understanding of patient experience alongside their clinical competencies. To create a conceptual bridge between these two fields (including narrative-based inquiry more broadly), we redescribe narrative (...) competence via Ronald Heifetz’s distinction of “technical” and “adaptive” challenges outlined in his adaptive leadership model. Heifetz, we argue, enriches learners’ self-understanding of the unique demands of cultivating narrative competence, which can be both elucidated on the page and tested within the charged yet supportive simulation environment. We introduce Co-constructive Patient Simulation (CCPS) to demonstrate how working with simulated patients can support narrative work by drawing on the clinical vicissitudes of learners in the formulation and enactment of case studies. The three movements of CCPS—resensing, retelling, and retooling—told through learner experiences, describe the affinities and divergences between narrative medicine’s sequence of attention, representation, and affiliation; Montello’s three forms of narrative competence (departure, performance, change), and Heifetz’s three steps (observe, interpret, and intervene) of adaptive leadership. (shrink)

This essay attempts to articulate three authors who have tried to think about the present time in its form of permanent crisis. Paulo Arantes with his theory of the age of emergency, Joshua Clover with his theory of the age of riots, and Wolfgang Streeck and the age of entropy. Arantes will serve as our theoretical foundation, while Clover will help us think about the informal masses that form in the riots while Streeck will help us think about the excessive (...) individualism of the present situation. It is in the latter that we recover the idea of the need to think about improvisation to conclude with what could be the general features of this. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, procura-se analisar os fatores envolvidos na determinação da natureza substancial do organismo vivo, em Aristóteles. Tais fatores seriam, por um lado, a forte unidade e coesão interna composicional e, por outro, o elevado caráter de independência quanto às propriedades essenciais ou formais, relativamente às propriedades dos componentes materiais, por meio dos quais o organismo vivo vem a ser formado, ou com referência aos outros tipos de particularidades de seres. Com esta análise, pretende-se mostrar, ao mesmo tempo, que (...) a unidade do composto orgânico-animado, de um modo geral, é constituída por um complexo arranjo de camadas estratificadas, no qual as camadas ou os tipos de composições materiais apresentam, entre si, um forte grau de interdependência. Tal interdependência entre as partes materiais, que formam uma rede composicional complexa e bem-articulada, faz com que as propriedades essenciais ou formais do todo orgânico se diferenciem sobremaneira das propriedades essenciais dos tipos de componentes que integram esse todo, caracterizando, assim, o caráter substancial da composição orgânica.In this paper, I will try to analyze the factors involved in determining the substantial nature of the living organism in Aristotle. Such factors would be, on the one hand, the strong unity and compositional internal cohesion and, on the other hand, the high character of independence as regards the essential or formal properties, relative to the proper properties of the material components through which the living organism comes to be formed, or relative to other types of particularities of beings. With this analysis, it is intended at the same time to show that, in a general way, the unity of the organic-animate compound is constituted by a complex arrangement of stratified layers, in which the layers or types of material compositions have a strong degree of interdependence among themselves. Such interdependence between the material parts, which form a complex and well-articulated compositional network, makes the essential or formal properties of the organic whole very different from the essential properties of the types of components that make up the whole, thus characterizing the substantial character of organic composition. (shrink)

O objetivo principal deste artigo é esclarecer como Brentano define a relação entre (a) o conhecimento de nossos próprios fenômenos de consciência e (b) o conhecimento de fenômenos de consciência de outros sujeitos. Por um lado, Brentano argumenta, seguindo a tradição moderna, que o conhecimento dos próprios atos mentais é absolutamente fundamental. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, ele quer mostrar com sua Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico uma clara alternativa ao introspeccionismo. Mostraremos como Brentano busca unir estes dois objetivos e (...) como ele também aderiu a esta linha em sua Psicologia Descritiva. Sua psicologia como um todo pode, portanto, ser entendida como um apelo ao pluralismo epistemológico. (shrink)

On the one hand, much has been written on Theodosius Dobzhansky’s central role in the development of the field of population genetics and modern evolutionary theory, as well as on his sociopolitical worldview in the middle of the Twentieth Century. On the other hand, much has also been written on Dobzhansky’s role in the institutionalization of genetics in Brazil, where he spent a considerable amount of time. Unfortunately, these literatures developed without any points of intersection or cross-reference. This article places (...) Dobzhansky’s work in Brazil in the broader contexts of the science and politics of its historical period. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAstrologers have exercised self-censorship throughout the centuries in order to fend off criticism. This was largely for religious reasons, but social, political, and ethical motivations also have to be taken into account. This paper explores the main reasons that led astrologers to increase censorship in their writings in the decades that preceded the Church’s regulations and offers some examples of this self-imposed restraint in astrological judgements.

In our everyday interactions we easily and effortlessly perceive emotions in others’ facial expressions and bodily behavior. How do we do that? Philosophers and psychologists have long argued about the fundamentals of emotion perception and the debate is far from settled. While some insist on the sufficiency of the morphological information contained in facial expressions, others construe the objects of emotion perception as more complex, comprising multimodal information such as touch, tone of voice, body postures, and so on. Others, in (...) turn, have gone so far as to deny that there is a pre-given object in emotion perception in the first place, so that processes of emotion perception must be conceptualized as emergent and co-constructed phenomena in contexts of social interaction. The purpose of this paper is to argue that John Dewey’s pragmatist theory of emotions can help us make significant theoretical advancements in the understanding of emotion perception, according to which emotions are coordinated modes of behavior that we enact with others in the contexts of social interactions. In this picture, perceiving emotions is a matter of participating in a joint activity of socio- affective coordination. This theory allows us to apprehend important insights about emotion perception that appear in these contemporary debates, while at the same time avoiding their pitfalls. (shrink)

How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our external environment? Many philosophers have answered this question in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and time and the movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this view sought to explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual mechanisms of object individuation. Neither explanation remains fully satisfactory. This book argues for a more desirable middle ground in terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought, where (...) this capacity is explained through graded practical knowledge of objects. This view allows us to do justice to important insights put forward by both positions criticized in the book, while avoiding their potential shortcomings. It also paves the way to a more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental representation, where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a central role in our cognitive life. Finally, it shows how practical knowledge may be firmly rooted in neurobiological processes and mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us about the mind. (shrink)

Law - Introduction, History, Philosophy And Sociology of Law. Philosophy. Politics. Democracy. Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, 1947-.

Il est couramment admis qu’il existe une corrélation, sinon un rapport de cause à effet, entre la fréquence lexicale d’une dérivation et sa productivité, mesurée à l’aune de sa force d’attraction analogique. Or cette thèse est démentie par l’examen détaillé des faits d’apophonie nominale en portugais. De deux alternances qui se partagent un sous-ensemble de nominaux, c’est la dérivation minoritaire, ainsi que le révèle l’analyse d’un corpus de 238 mots, qui, depuis le XIXème siècle, gagne lentement du terrain dans le (...) standard de Lisbonne, et y exerce une force analogique sur l’alternance majoritaire sans commune mesure avec le phénomène inverse. On déduira de cet apparent paradoxe et de sa spécificité dialectale que le véritable moteur du changement analogique ne réside pas dans le nombre d’entrées voire de sorties lexicales, mais dans l’existence, au sein de la grammaire du locuteur, de « schèmes dérivationnels » pouvant à l’occasion être mis en concurrence sous certaines conditions distributionnelles et sociolinguistiques. (shrink)

Il est couramment admis qu’il existe une corrélation, sinon un rapport de cause à effet, entre la fréquence lexicale d’une dérivation et sa productivité, mesurée à l’aune de sa force d’attraction analogique. Or cette thèse est démentie par l’examen détaillé des faits d’apophonie nominale en portugais. De deux alternances qui se partagent un sous-ensemble de nominaux, c’est la dérivation minoritaire, ainsi que le révèle l’analyse d’un corpus de 238 mots, qui, depuis le XIXème siècle, gagne lentement du terrain dans le (...) standard de Lisbonne, et y exerce une force analogique sur l’alternance majoritaire sans commune mesure avec le phénomène inverse. On déduira de cet apparent paradoxe et de sa spécificité dialectale que le véritable moteur du changement analogique ne réside pas dans le nombre d’entrées voire de sorties lexicales, mais dans l’existence, au sein de la grammaire du locuteur, de « schèmes dérivationnels » pouvant à l’occasion être mis en concurrence sous certaines conditions distributionnelles et sociolinguistiques. (shrink)

Cognitive sciences as an interdisciplinary field, involving scientific disciplines (such as computer science, linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, economics, etc.), philosophical disciplines (philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, analytic philosophy, etc.) and engineering (notably knowledge engineering), have a vast theoretical and practical content, some even conflicting. In this interdisciplinary context and on computational modeling, ontologies play a crucial role in communication between disciplines and also in a process of innovation of theories, models and experiments in cognitive sciences. We propose a model for (...) this process here. An ontological commitment is advocated as the framework of a scientific realism, which leads computational modeling to search for more realistic models, for a complex systems perspective of nature and cognition. In that way multiagent modeling of complex systems has been fulfilling an important role. (shrink)

La Lectura Ordinaria super sacram scripturam attribuée à Henri de Gand fut conservée dans un seul manuscrit qui date de la fin du 13e ou du début du 14e siècle . Sa description et son histoire ont été faites par le dr. Raymond Macken en 1972, qui est aussi l'éditeur de l'ouvrage. L'édition critique du texte nous a permis de constater l'existence de certaines ressemblances entre son contenu et les autres œuvres d'Henri de Gand, sûrement authentiques. Déjà avant l’édition de (...) R. Macken, et etant donnée l'importance considérable de Platon et d'Avicenne dans les pages de la Lectura, Beryl Smalley parlait de l'attribution de l'ouvrage à Henri «as a working hypothesis». Cependant, nous devons d'abord à R. Macken, et après à Gordon A. Wilson, les examens les plus complets du problème de l'attribution résultant de la comparaison du texte avec les Quodlibeta et la Summa. (shrink)

De todos os aspectos do comportamento não-verbal, a face é sem dúvida uma das mais ricas e importantes fontes de informação sobre o estado inter- no do outro. Mas expressões faciais são raramente percebidas de forma isolada. Ao contrário, são tipicamente inseridas em contextos sociais ricos e dinâmicos, que incluem gestos e posturas corporais, conhecimento situacional, etc. Com base nessas observações, podemos nos perguntar se o contexto no qual uma expressão é percebida pode influenciar a percepção de emoções nesta expressão. (...) No caso de uma resposta afirmativa, de que modo se daria essa influência contextual, e quais seriam os seus limites? O propósito desse artigo é explorar algumas possibilidades sobre o papel do contexto na percepção de emoções, desde a teoria das emoções básicas, que defende que categorias discretas de emoções podem ser lidas diretamente da face de forma invariável, a abordagens mais contemporâneas, que atribuem um papel constitutivo para o contexto na percepção de emoções. Embora o debate esteja longe de ser resolvido, as conclusões deste artigo apontam para um novo modo de se pensar sobre fenômenos emocionais, onde a díade de interação torna-se a unidade básica de análise, e onde emoções são concebidas como propriedades emergentes de relações em contextos particulares de interação social. (shrink)